Risk bow-tie
Strategy & decisionsField guide · Strategy & decisions · 5 of 6
What could release one hazard, what follows, and what barriers stand between?
A risk bow-tie is drawn around the moment control over one hazard is lost: the threats that could cause it on the left, the consequences that could follow on the right, and a barrier across each path between.
| Mark | Drawn as | Stands for | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| hazard | a box above the knot | “any agent or operational situation that may cause harm”, with its scale and place | Manton et al. |
| top event | a box at the knot | the moment control over the hazard is lost | Manton et al. |
| threat | a box at the left | a cause enough by itself to bring about the top event | Manton et al.; Boult and McCulloch |
| consequence | a box at the right | the worst credible result if no barrier holds | Manton et al. |
| barrier | a box across a path | prevention on the left, mitigation on the right; each effective, independent and auditable | Manton et al. |
| degradation factor and control | a box on a side line into a barrier, its control across that line | what can make a barrier fail, and what guards against it; not in the figure | Johnson et al., §2 |
| barrier condition | a color on the barrier, or +, 0 or − beside it | how well the barrier works; not in the figure, which is drawn in one color | Johnson et al., §5.1 |
| lines of defense | thick lines | not in the figure, which is drawn at one width | MoD, §1.1.1 |
A line with an arrowhead
Section titled “A line with an arrowhead”A risk bow-tie has no arrowheads: each line is a path that can lead, read left to right, from a threat to the top event and from it to a consequence. An effect relates two quantities, a change in one changing the other; a bow-tie’s path joins events, and a barrier across it stops the path.
A mine’s tailings dam failing
Section titled “A mine’s tailings dam failing”Of the tailings dam failures from 1915 to 2016 counted by the International Commission on Large Dams and by David Chambers, overtopping caused 44, earthquakes 27 and seepage 17. At Samarco in 2015 a breach killed nineteen people and the slurry traveled 650 km to the sea; the company had no emergency plan, warning lights or sirens. After the Baia Mare spill of 2000, an international task force chaired by the European Commission insisted on emergency storage.
When to draw one
Section titled “When to draw one”Draw one where the people who run a hazardous operation need to see, for one hazard, each threat, each consequence and the barriers on every path: the CCPS and Energy Institute committee wrote for operators, maintenance technicians and managers who want “short, clear, preferably visual, overviews”. Outside oil and gas, where it began, the technique suits industries where quantifying the risk isn’t warranted (MoD).
When not to draw one
Section titled “When not to draw one”Without fault tree or event tree analysis, a bow-tie is not quantified, and whether its barriers are enough is not evaluated (MoD). Johnson et al. warn against too many bow-ties drawn too soon.
Reasoning and polish
Section titled “Reasoning and polish”- Hazard, top event, threats, consequences and barriers
- Barrier owners and types, degradation factors and degradation controls
- Barrier effectiveness and condition, independence, and review of degraded barriers
Related types
Section titled “Related types”No type is listed as related to this one.
Sources
Section titled “Sources”- Mark Manton and others, “Standardisation of Bow Tie Methodology and Terminology via a CCPS/EI Book”, IChemE Hazards 27, Symposium Series 162 (2017), on each mark’s meaning and the barrier rule.
- Martin Johnson, Mark Manton, Charles Cowley and Mark Scanlon, “Bow Ties in Risk Management: Using the New CCPS-EI Book to Avoid Pitfalls”, IChemE Hazards 28, Symposium Series 163 (2018), §§2, 5.1 and 8.3, on the marks in order, degradation controls, barrier condition and too many bow-ties.
- Mark Boult and Paul McCulloch, Introduction to the CCPS / Energy Institute Process Safety Book “Bow Ties in Risk Management” (presentation, DNV GL and CGE, undated), on threats.
- UK Ministry of Defence, ASEMS, Bow-Tie Diagram, §§1.1.1–1.1.3, on the two sides, lines of defence, safety cases, uses and limits.
- Charles Roche, Kristina Thygesen and Elaine Baker (eds), Mine Tailings Storage: Safety Is No Accident (UN Environment and GRID-Arendal, 2017), pp. 17, 29–30 and 44, for the figure’s hazard, threats, barriers and consequences, with the International Commission on Large Dams’ (2001) and Chambers’s (2017) counts of failures by cause, reproduced on p. 30, as read on 10 October 2026.